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<ct> Foreign policy between opt-outs and closer cooperation 
<au> Panos Koutrakos 
 
<a> 1. INTRODUCTION 
The legal framework which governs the foreign and security policy of the European Union 
(EU) provides an intriguing case study of flexibility. On the one hand, it has provided fertile 
ground for an impressive range of structures of flexibility, both formal and informal, which 
have emerged in different ways and for different reasons over the course of the development 
of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a distinct strand of the Union's external 
action. On the other hand, flexibility has been inherent in the conduct of the policy as a matter 
of practice and quite independently from the legal mechanisms set out in the Union’s primary 
rules.  
This chapter will argue that there is a density of rules and procedures goverining flexibility 
which which has developed independently from the ad hoc arrangements prevailing in the 
area of secrity and defence as a matter of practice. This phenonemon illustrates a heavily 
proceduralised emphasis on law which is justified by neither prior experience, nor subsequent 
practice. The analysis is structured as follows. First, it will examine the typology of flexibility 
mechanisms set out in the rules which govern the CFSP and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). Secondly, it will explore the central position of flexibility in the 
design and application of the CFSP/CSDP system and its impact on the conduct of the 
Union's security and defence policy. Finally, it will reflect on the qualitative differences 
which characterize flexibility in this area compared to other strands of EU action.  
 
<a> 2. FLEXIBILITY AS AN INHERENT CHARACTERISTIC OF CFSP/CSDP 
2 
Flexibility has been inherent in the very design of the legal set of rules which governs 
CFSP/CSDP. This was apparent quite early on, since its inception as a distinct legal 
framework within the Union's constitutional structure.  
 
<b> 2.1 The General Opt-out for Denmark 
The Single European Act (SEA) incorporated in primary law the first sets of rules on foreign 
policy. These were laid down in Article 30 SEA and governed the European Political 
Cooperation, the precursor to CFSP.
1
 As these rules were of a somewhat loose wording and 
aimed merely to formalize prior institutional practice, the issue of an opt-out was not raised.  
Things changed when the EU was established at Maastricht and the CFSP was introduced 
as a formal part of its constitutional structure. The formalization of CFSP was accompanied 
by an express opt-out for Denmark. The opt-out originates in a Decision of the Heads of 
Government and State adopted in Edinburgh in December 1992 following the rejection of the 
Maastricht Treaty by referendum in Denmark. It should be recalled that the Maastricht Treaty 
provided for the first time for the CFSP and set out a tighter set of rules to govern this policy 
in the form of the much maligned second pillar.
2
 The opt-out was then formalised in a 
Protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty and has been retained in every amendment of the 
Union's primary rules.  
The Danish opt-out is set out in its current form in Protocol 22 on the Position of Denmark 
Article 5 of which reads as follows:  
 
                                                 
1
 On EPC, see Simon Nuttall, ‘European Political Co-operation and the Single European Act’ (1985) 5 Yearbook 
of European Law 203 and Stelios Perrakis, ‘L’incidence de l’Acte Unique Européen sur la Cooperation des 
Douze en Matière de Politique Etrangére’ (1988) 34 Annuaire Français de Droit International 807. 
2
 On the Maastricht rules on CFSP, see Panos Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU 
Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2001) 18–26. 
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<quotation> With regard to measures adopted by the Council pursuant to Article 26(1), Article 42 
and Articles 43 to 46 of the Treaty on European Union, Denmark does not participate in the 
elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications. Therefore Denmark shall not participate in their adoption. Denmark will not prevent 
the other Member States from further developing their cooperation in this area. Denmark shall not 
be obliged to contribute to the financing of operational expenditure arising from such measures, nor 
to make military capabilities available to the Union. 
The unanimity of the members of the Council, with the exception of the representative of the 
government of Denmark, shall be necessary for the acts of the Council which must be adopted 
unanimously. 
For the purposes of this Article, a qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 
238(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.</quotation>  
 
 The material scope of the opt-out is defined in two ways: the first is in relation to 
measures adopted by the Union, namely general guidelines defined by the European Council 
and measures adopted in the context of CSDP; the second way is in relation to the effect of 
EU measures, namely the defence implications of EU decisions and actions. Article 5 of the 
Protocol only refers to guidelines defined by the European Council. This by no means 
suggests that the scope of the opt-out is confined to them. On the one hand, this choice is 
explained by the express reference in Article 26(1) first subparagraph TEU to the possibility 
that such measures may have defence implications. On the other hand, Article 26(2) first 
subparagraph TEU bestows on the Council the responsibility for the definition and 
implementation of CFSP by means of decisions and on the basis of the general guidelines 
defined by the European Council.  
Another question raised by the wording of the first indent of Article 5 of the Protocol is 
about the choice of words which refer to the CSDP provisions: while all provisions of Section 
4 
2 of Title V TEU are mentioned, that is the CSDP-specific part of the CFSP set of rules, these 
provisions are not mentioned as a whole. Instead, reference is made expressly to Article 42 
TEU and then to Articles 43–46 TEU. The unnecessarily cumbersome wording of the above 
rules notwithstanding, Article 5 of the Protocol exempts Denmark from the ambit of any 
CFSP measure with any defence implications. The opt-out refers to decision-making, 
implementation and financing of any such measures.  
 
<b> 2.2 Ad hoc Opt-outs: Constructive Abstention 
In addition to the permanent opt-out granted to Denmark, EU law also provides for the 
possibility of an opt-out for individual Member States on an ad hoc basis. This takes the form 
of constructive abstention which aims to render the unanimity rule, pursuant to Article 31(1) 
first subparagraph TEU, more workable. It is set out in Article 31(1) second subparagraph 
TEU and reads as follows:  
 
<quotation> When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention 
by making a formal declaration under the present sub-paragraph. In that case, it shall not be 
obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit 
of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to 
conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall 
respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way 
represent at least one third of the Member State comprising one third of the population of the 
Union, the decision shall not be adopted.</quotation>  
 
The provision for constructive abstention has been part of the CFSP rules since the 
Amsterdam Treaty
3
 and its function is to ensure that decision-making is not rendered hostage 
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 See art. 23(1) second subparagraph TEU (Amsterdam). 
5 
to a lone dissenter or a small minority of dissenters. It has only been invoked once, by Cyprus 
in February 2008 in the context of the launching of EULEX Kosovo under Joint Action 
2008/124/CFSP.
4
 The political sensitivity underpinning this incident is apparent: Cyprus did 
not and has not recognized Kosovo as it objects to setting an international precedent which 
might be deemed relevant to the self-proclaimed Republic of Northern Cyprus.
5
 However, it 
did not wish its political objections to the issue of recognition to prevent the Union from 
engaging in a mission which would contribute to the peace and stabilization in the Balkans.  
 
<b> 2.3 Security Opt-outs: Acknowledging National Choices about Defence 
Opt-outs, whether general or ad hoc, introduce flexibility by enabling specific Member States 
not to participate at all in a host of or specific policy initiatives. There is another form of 
flexibility which is indirect in the ways in which it manifests itself. It is about the 
acknowledgment of the fundamental defence choices made by Member States. This is 
illustrated by the second subparagraph of Article 42(2) TEU which reads as follows:  
 
<quotation> The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the 
specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall 
respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realized in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be 
compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that 
framework.</quotation>  
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 For political reasons, four other Member States (Spain, Greece, Slovakia, and Romania) have also not 
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6 
 There are six EU Member States which are not NATO members, namely Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus.
6
 However, it is not just their special status that 
Article 42(2) TEU seeks to protect. The broad wording of this provision suggests a ‘catch-all 
clause’7 which aims to accommodate the security and defence considerations prevailing in 
different Member States. In fact, these qualifications are significant because they tell us 
something about the general tenor of the CSDP, that is its inherently limited function, its 
narrow reach, and the centrality of the Member States whose right to make the fundamental 
choices about their defence is not called into doubt.  
This central aspect of the character of the policy is underlined further by Declarations 13 
and 14 concerning the common foreign and security policy annexed to the Lisbon Treaty.  
The former reads as follows:  
 
<quotation> The Conference underlines that the provisions in the Treaty on European Union 
covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the creation of the office of 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the 
establishment of an External Action Service, do not affect the responsibilities of the Member 
States, as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of 
their national representation in third countries and international organisations. 
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 Following the adoption of the Nice Treaty, the Irish Constitution was amended in order to include the following 
clause: ‘[t]he State shall not adopt a decision taken by the European Council to establish a common defence 
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7
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International and European Affairs 2009), para. 28. 
7 
The Conference also recalls that the provisions governing the Common Security and Defence 
Policy do not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the 
Member States. 
It stresses that the European Union and its Member States will remain bound by the provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, by the primary responsibility of the 
Security Council and of its Members for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.</quotation>  
 
Declaration 14 reads as follows:  
 
<quotation> In addition to the specific rules and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of 
Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union, the Conference underlines that the provisions 
covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy including in relation to the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the External Action 
Service will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member 
State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic 
service, relations with third countries and participation in international organisations, 
including a Member State's membership of the Security Council of the United Nations. 
The Conference also notes that the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy do not give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase 
the role of the European Parliament. 
The Conference also recalls that the provisions governing the Common Security and Defence 
Policy do not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the 
Member States.</quotation>  
 
 The largely repetitive wording of the above Declarations focuses on the role of 
Member States in designing and carrying out their foreign policy as fully sovereign subjects 
8 
of international law. It also expressly maintains that 'the specific character of the security and 
defence policy of the Member States' would not be undermined by the CSDP provisions of 
the Lisbon Treaty. This illustrates a different type of flexibility, broader in its scope and wider 
in its implications as it touches upon the very core of CSDP. It is also more pervasive as it 
permeates the whole range of the Union’s actions and underpins the specific ways in which 
the CSDP is carried out.  
This type of flexibility ought to be understood in the context of the broader position of 
CSDP within the Union's constitutional order. The Lisbon Treaty approaches foreign, security 
and defence policy on the basis of a bifurcated approach. On the one hand, in the light of the 
arrangements introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and the ensuing revamping of the Union’s 
external policies, CFSP appears integrated within the system governing the EU’s external 
action: the much-maligned pillar structure is abolished and a set of principles and objectives 
are set out in Article 24 TEU and apply both to CFSP and all other strands of EU external 
action (economic, trade and political). So strong is the emphasis on the appearance of 
integration that the term ‘external action’ has been chosen to cover all strands of EU external 
relations, including CFSP/CSDP, hence conveying a sense of unity and common perspective. 
Therefore, the current constitutional arrangements stress the substantive integration of CFSP 
within the broader contours of EU external action.  
On the other hand, the language of integration in which certain provisions about the 
constitutional position and conduct of CFSP are couched ought to be assessed against the 
clear indications of the distinct nature of the policy. First, the CFSP rules are not set out in the 
TFEU along with the provisions governing all the other strands of external action. Instead, 
they are laid down in the TEU. In fact, along with CSDP it is the only substantive policy 
whose provisions are set out in TEU. Secondly, the Union’s competence in the area of CFSP 
is distinguished from the other EU competences and is not included in Article 2 TFEU and, 
9 
therefore, may not be characterized as either exclusive, shared, coordinating, supporting or 
supplementing. Instead, it is listed separately in Article 2(4) TEU. Similarly, Article 24(1) 
subparagraph 2 TEU states that the common foreign and security policy ‘is subject to specific 
rules and procedures’. Thirdly, Article 40 TEU, which refers to the relationship between the 
CFSP rules and the rest of the primary rules governing the Union's action, underlines further 
the distinct legal position of CFSP rules. Therefore, the whole logic of the institutional and 
normative underpinnings of CFSP/CSDP underline their distinct nature within the EU 
constitutional framework.
8
 
 
<a> 3. ENHANCED COOPERATION IN CFSP/CSDP  
The main provision for enhanced cooperation is set out in Article 20 TEU and the 
arrangements about its application in Articles 362–364 TFEU. Their analysis is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.
9
 For the purposes of this analysis, suffice it to point out that the scope of 
the application of this mechanism to CFSP is broader under the Lisbon Treaty in two ways. 
The first is about its relationship with existing policy initiatives. Under the pre-existing rules, 
enhanced cooperation was confined to measures adopted in order to implement a joint action 
or a common position.
10
 This restriction is now removed. The second way in which the scope 
of enhanced cooperation is broadened is in relation to security and defence policy. The pre-
Lisbon provision exempted this area,
11
 but this restriction is not repeated in Article 20 TEU. 
By broadening the scope of enhanced cooperation in relation to CFSP/CSDP activities, the 
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Lisbon Treaty appears to render the latter closer to the mainstream of EU activities. It also 
appears to suggest an understanding of CFSP/CSDP as a policy space which is closer to other 
EU policies in conceptual terms than the previous constitutional arrangement had suggested. 
In doing so, Article 20 TEU reflects the language of integration in which the constitutional 
constellation laid down in the Lisbon Treaty is couched. A case in point is the elaboration of a 
set of principles and objectives common to all strands of EU external action set out in Article 
21(1)–(2) TEU.12 As enhanced cooperation aims 'to further the objectives of the Union', and 
given the single set of objectives of what the EU does in the world, the normalisation of the 
position of CFSP/CSDP within the scope of application of Article 20 TEU reflects the 
overhaul of EU external action carried out at Lisbon. 
Furthermore, the procedure for the establishment of enhanced cooperation in CFSP is 
somewhat distinct from that which applies to other policies.
13
 The Member States which wish 
to establish such cooperation between them are to address their request to the Council, rather 
than the Commission, and they are not required to specify the scope and objectives of the 
enhanced cooperation proposed.
14
 The request is to be forwarded both to the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and to the Commission: 
the former gives an opinion on the consistency of the establishment of enhanced cooperation 
with the EU's CFSP, and the latter gives an opinion on its consistency with other EU policies. 
The consent of the European Parliament is not required. Instead, the request for the 
establishment of enhanced cooperation is to be forwarded to it for information.  
                                                 
12
 See art. 21(3) TEU.  
13
 See art. 329(2) TFEU. 
14
 This is a requirement which applies to the other policy areas under art. 329(1) TFEU.  
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Finally, the conditions for the participation of a Member State in an enhanced cooperation 
mechanism already in progress are also set out separately.
15
 The intention to participate is 
notified to the Council, the High Representative, and the Commission. However, no specific 
role for the Commission is laid down. It is for the Council to confirm the participation of the 
Member State having consulted the High Representative and after noting, where necessary, 
that the conditions of participations are fulfilled. In cases where it takes the view that the 
conditions for participation of the requesting Member State are not fulfilled, the Council 
‘indicates the arrangements to be adopted to fulfil those conditions and shall set a deadline for 
re-examining the request for participation’.16 The High Representative may propose 
transitional measures which may be necessary for the application of acts already adopted in 
the context of enhanced cooperation. Such measures are adopted by the Council. In this 
context, it appears that it is the role of the Council, acting by unanimity of the participating 
Member States,
17
 rather than that of the Commission which is central. This reflects the 
distinct character of CFSP and its position within the broader constitutional landscape: the 
Union's primary rules may well be couched in the language of integration, but the 
distinctiveness of CFSP/CSDP is actually reinforced. 
 
<a> 4. FORMALIZATION OF FLEXIBILITY PURSUANT TO THE LISBON TREATY  
One of the innovations introduced at Lisbon is the formalization of flexibility, that is the 
establishment of mechanisms which would authorize an ad hoc group of Member States to 
undertake CSDP actions on behalf of the Union. There are two such mechanisms.  
 
                                                 
15
 Art. 331(2) TFEU.  
16
 Art. 331(2) subpara. 2 TFEU. 
17
 Art. 331(2) subpara. 3 TFEU.  
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<b> 4.1 Member States Acting on Behalf of the Union 
According to Article 42(5) TEU, the ‘Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the 
Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union’s values and 
serve its interests’. This would be done in accordance with the standard voting requirement, 
namely unanimity, pursuant to Article 42(4) TEU, and following a proposal by the High 
Representative or an initiative by a Member State. 
The delegation of this role is governed by Article 44 TEU which reads as follows:  
 
<quotation> 1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the 
Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing 
and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among 
themselves on the management of the task. 
2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress 
on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the 
Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require 
amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred 
to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. </quotation> 
 
 It follows from the above that there are two substantive conditions which need to be 
met: the first is subjective and requires that the Member States involved are willing to 
implement the task in question; the second condition is objective, and requires that the 
Member States involved have the necessary capability for such a task. The wording of Article 
44(1) TEU makes it clear that these conditions must be met cumulatively.  
The management of the task is for the relevant Member States to agree among themselves 
in association with the High Representative. It is not clear what the role of the High 
13 
Representative is in this context. As the Member States act in order to protect the Union’s 
interest, they may not decline to consult with the High Representative. In any case, the 
expertise of the latter (assisted by the resources of the European External Action Service) on 
the management of CSDP tasks would make her advice invaluable for the Member States 
concerned. However, the High Representative may not dictate how a task should be managed 
under Article 44 TEU.  
The above provision suggests a degree of close interaction between Member States and EU 
institutional bodies in the context of actions undertaken by Member States on behalf of the 
Union. In fact, there is a reasonably tight framework which provides for adequate supervision. 
In any case, the subject-matter of such actions  distinguishes the legal and policy context set 
out in Article 44 TEU from other areas of EU law where Member States act as trustees of the 
Union's interests.
18
 The applicable criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the procedures 
governing management and accountability for tasks delegated to Member States allow room 
for political flexibility and independent action by those actually involved. 
 
<b> 4.2 Permanent Structured Cooperation  
The Treaty provides  a mechanism for permanent structured cooperation. In accordance with 
Article 42(6) TEU, this is open to Member States ‘whose military capabilities fulfil higher 
criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a 
view to the most demanding missions’. However, rather than merely outlining the relevant 
criteria, the drafters of the Treaty seek to define them. In a Protocol attached to the Lisbon 
Treaty, the commitments on military capabilities are set out in detail. In Article 1, a Member 
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Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart Pubishing 2011) 435. 
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State wishing to participate in a structured cooperation mechanism is required to:  
 
 <quotation> (a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the 
development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational 
forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the 
field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European 
Defence Agency), and 
(b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of 
multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a 
tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable 
of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union, within a 
period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations 
Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to 
at least 120 days.</quotation>  
 
In Article 2, the Protocol requires the participating Member States to: 
 
<quotation>(a) cooperate, as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a view to 
achieving approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence 
equipment, and regularly review these objectives, in the light of the security environment and of 
the Union's international responsibilities; 
(b) bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, particularly by 
harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, 
specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields 
of training and logistics; 
(c) take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and 
deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the 
15 
commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing their national decision-making procedures; 
(d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good, including 
through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to undertakings in this regard within 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the 
‘Capability Development Mechanism’; 
 (e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment 
programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency. </quotation>  
 
 Member States fulfilling the criteria and having made the above commitments may 
notify their intention to engage in permanent structured cooperation to the Council and the 
High Representative. In accordance with Article 46(2) TEU, the decision to establish such 
cooperation rests with the Council which is expected to take it within three months following 
notification by a qualified majority and following consultation with the High Representative. 
Once permanent structured cooperation has been established, any decision and 
recommendation by the Council on its management is taken unanimously on the basis of the 
votes of the representatives of the participating Member States under Article 46(6) TEU, 
unless otherwise provided for in Article 46 TEU.  
There are certain principles which appear to govern the permanent structured cooperation 
mechanism. First, the principle of openness: provided that the criteria and requirements set 
out in Article 46(1) TEU and Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol are met, any Member State may 
participate in the mechanism, either ab initio or at a later stage. In the latter case, following a 
notification from the relevant State to the Council and the High Representative, the former 
will adopt the decision confirming the participation of the Member State by qualified majority 
of the participating Member States and after consulting the latter.
19
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 Art. 46(3) subpara. 2 TEU. 
16 
The second principle is that of continuity: every participating Member State must fulfil the 
criteria and make the necessary commitments throughout their participation. According to 
Article 46(4) TEU, if at any point it ceases to do so, the Council may suspend the 
participation of the Member State concerned by a qualified majority of the members 
representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in 
question. In this respect, Article 3 of the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation 
provides for the involvement of the European Defence Agency (EDA). In accordance with 
this provision, the role of EDA is broad: it contributes to the regular assessment of 
participating Member States’ contributions regarding capabilities in general, and in particular 
these made in accordance with the criteria elaborated upon on the basis of amongst others, 
Article 2 of the Protocol. However, its impact is limited, at least as a matter of law: while it is 
entrusted with reporting at least once a year, its assessment ‘may serve as a basis for Council 
recommendations and decisions adopted in accordance with Article 46 of the Treaty on 
European Union’.20  
Third, the free will of the Member States is an essential precondition for their participation: 
any participating Member State may withdraw by notifying its intention to do so to the 
Council. The latter has no power to approve or to veto this. In accordance with Article 46(5) 
TEU, it  can only ‘take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate’.  
The procedural arrangements governing the establishment of and participation in 
permanent structured cooperation suggest the willingness of the drafters of the Treaties to 
facilitate recourse to this mechanism. This is consistent with overall tenor of the Lisbon 
Treaty. After all, it is at Lisbon that the possibility of enhanced cooperation is extended for 
the first time to the area of security and defence policy. From a pragmatic point of view, this 
is sensible, given that the defence capabilities of Member States differ widely and only in the 
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17 
case of a handful of them are they robust enough to carry out their internal security function 
and be deployed in different areas in the context of multinational operations simultaneously.  
On the other hand, once the permanent structured cooperation mechanism has been 
established, the applicable procedure reverts to the one which governs all CSDP decisions, 
that is unanimity. The logic of the functioning of enhanced cooperation, therefore, is that of 
the conduct of CSDP generally: the direction and pace of development relies entirely upon 
Member States.  
As for the definition of the capabilities criteria mentioned in Article 46(1) TEU and set out 
in Article 2 of the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation, the relevant primary rules 
are not particularly illuminating. Their interpretation is subject to a dynamic, incrementally 
evolving process. Both Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol suggest that they need to be further 
elaborated and defined in greater detail.  This is realistic given that requirements related to 
military capabilities may vary depending on factors as diverse as technical and operational 
needs, geopolitical environment, activities of international security organizations, financial 
conditions, and political commitment. Treaties are unsuited to defining with any degree of 
precision such requirements. On the other hand, the vagueness of the relevant provisions is 
such as to render their application entirely a matter to be determined on the basis of factors as 
inherently fluid as political will, and as constantly evolving as economic realities.  
Considerable vagueness characterises, therefore, the legal rules on permanent structured 
cooperation. Viewed as a way of enabling the Union to shape its security and defence identity 
more efficiently, one might have hoped that the mechanism of permanent structured 
cooperation would have provided a clearer yardstick as to quite how the Member States  
might rely upon it. The relevant legal provisions appear to acknowledge that their contribution 
to the Union's foreign affairs is merely to set out the broad parameters within which the 
Member States and the Union's institutional actors may determine how to proceed, at what 
18 
pace and in which direction. In this respect, there was some discussion amongst Member 
States during the Belgian Presidency in the latter part of 2010, and a German-Swedish 
proposal for closer military cooperation.
21
 However, neither has given rise to an progress 
under the legal umbrella provided by the TEU on permanent structured cooperation.  
 
<a> 5. DIFFERENTIATION IN CFSP/CSDP AS A PARADOX 
The analysis so far has suggested that flexibility and differentiation are an inherent 
characteristic of the legal framework which governs CFSP/CSDP. In their various forms, the 
different permutations of interests which are expected to be addressed, and the variety of 
actors involved make this policy area an ideal canvass in which the Member States may 
experiment with the legal management of flexibility. The drafters of the Treaties appear to 
accept this as they provide legal formulas which would seek to address a wide range of 
manifestations of flexibility.  
The wide range of mechanisms set out in EU law and practice is a main characteristic of 
flexibility in CFSP/CSDP. This may be due to the fact that this policy area appears ideally 
suited for the application of flexibility mechanisms because of the nature of their subject-
matter. As foreign policy and security and defence lie at the core of national sovereignty, their 
conduct is in greater need of being attuned to the different interests which Member States 
have in the area of high politics. This is all the more so in the light of the wide range of 
diverse Member States  – small and large, north and south, new and old, rich and poor. While 
apparent in decision-making in any policy area, the differences to which this diversity gives 
rise emerge more starkly in foreign policy. In doing so, they introduce a factor which is 
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 For a discussion of these developments, see Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, ‘CSDP and the “Ghent 
Framework”: The Indirect Approach to Permanent Structured Cooperation?’ (2011) 16 European Foreign 
Affairs Review 149. [The chapter was finalised in April 2014]. 
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inherently intangible, and yet central to policy-making. This dimension was set out succinctly 
by Advocate General Jacobs, as he then was, in a different context in Case C-120/94 
Commission v Greece:
 22
  
 
<quotation> Because of differences of geography and history each of the Member States has its 
own specific problems and preoccupations in the field of foreign and security policy. Each Member 
State is better placed than the Community institutions or the other Member States when it is a 
question of weighing up the dangers posed for it by the conduct of a third State. Security is, 
moreover, a matter of perception rather than hard fact. What one Member State perceives as an 
immediate threat to its external security may strike another Member State as relatively 
harmless.</quotation>  
 
 This inherently indeterminate dimension of the subject-matter of CFSP/CSDP may 
explain why it may be viewed as fertile ground for flexibility. 
The second characteristic is the gradual formalization and proceduralization of flexibility 
which is apparent in this policy area. Emerging gradually over the years, the Treaties 
provisions examined in this chapter intend to provide for legal solutions which would enable 
groups of Member States to do together within a set EU framework what they may otherwise 
choose to do beyond the EU structure altogether.  
The third noteworthy feature of flexibility in this area has to do with the broader context of 
foreign policy in the EU. Coalitions of States have always been active in a manner 
considerably more direct than we encountered in other policy areas. For instance, in the 1990s 
there were bi-annual meetings between the leaders of the UK, France, Spain, Italy and 
Germany and the Turkish Prime Minister. Another prominent example of groups of Member 
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20 
States cooperating closely beyond the framework of the Union’s primary rules was provided 
by the Contact Group in former Yugoslavia. 
However, the effort to cater for such a range of flexibility mechanisms in legal terms is 
also characterized by certain problems. First, there is already considerable flexibility and 
enhanced cooperation within the CSDP as a matter of practice. A case in point is the existence 
of battlegroups. This is an initiative focused on the swift deployment of ‘effective, credible 
and coherent’ rapid reaction units.23 Declared operational on 1 January 2007, battlegroups 
consist of 1,500 troops each of which should be deployable at 15 days notice and sustainable 
for at least 30 days (potentially extended to 120 days) either as a stand-alone force or as a part 
of a larger operation. The idea is that the EU should have two battlegroups on standby call at 
all times and that both should rotate every six months. This would enable the Union to carry 
out two simultaneous operation for a period of up to four months. Each battlegroup is led by a 
Member State which acts as the lead nation and provides the assets either on its own or with 
the contribution of other States. This initiative developed from the bottom up, an expression 
of the concern of the Member State that small, tangible forces would contribute effectively to 
the conduct of CSDP. No primary rules were required, and the absence of a detailed 
procedural framework for their establishment by no means prevented the establishment of 
battlegroups. 
Second, in the area of defence in particular, a lot hinges on practical considerations: the 
defence capabilities of Member States, their willingness to deploy them, their ability to pay 
for them, the political capital which such choices would entail for the government of the day. 
In this respect, it is noteworthy that these practicalities appear to be acknowledged by the 
Member States. A case in point is the establishment of the European Defence Agency, an 
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intergovernmental agency which specializes in the area of defence capabilities development, 
research, acquisition and armaments.
24
 And yet, everything about the Agency reminds us of 
the limits of primary legal rules in the area. It was established prior to the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty,
25
 and its work has been limited in effect and marred by disagreements 
among Member States, not least on issues related to the budget of the Agency. 
The relevant legal framework illustrates the rather strong belief of its drafters that the 
provision of legal rules and procedures is a necessary feature of flexibility in CFSP/CSDP. 
The formalization of flexibility in primary law has been viewed as introducing a set of rules 
of considerable complexity which may prevent the emergence of initiatives by Member States 
beyond the EU framework altogether.
26
 This view is entirely consistent with the broader tenor 
of the EU’s approach to security and defence: a conviction that a tighter legal framework with 
a strong institutional and procedural dimension would enhance the effectiveness of the policy. 
This is the process-oriented approach which underpins the current rules on CFSP.
27
  
This view ignores two factors. The first factor is practice. Practice of CFSP/CSDP does not 
suggest a reduced appetite for Member States to act in parallel to or even independently from 
EU initiatives. The experience in Libya is a case in point. It is recalled that, in March 2011, a 
coalition of various States initiated a military operation against Libya under the authorization 
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of United Nations Security Council Resolution (2011) 1973.
28
 This operation aimed to 
enforce a no-fly zone and a naval blockade. It led, controversially but inevitably, to strikes 
against forces remaining loyal to Gaddafi. The operation was not carried out by the EU, but a 
number of individual States and was led by the UK and France, while the US were content, 
for political reasons, to play second fiddle. It is worth noting that Germany abstained at the 
UN Security Council vote on SC Resolution 1973, in the company of China and Russia. It is 
also interesting that British Prime Minister David Cameron, French then President Nicolas 
Sarkozy and US President Barack Obama wrote an article about the operation in which there 
was not a single reference to the European Union.
29
  
The second factor is the profound role of the practicalities of an effective security policy: 
on the one hand, the political will of national governments to commit troops and capabilities, 
personnel and resources; on the other hand, the perilous state of defence industries. These are 
intrinsically linked: the Member States have shown little interest in addressing together the 
issue of their capabilities in a politically sensible and economically rational manner.
30
  
These two factors have something else in common too: they are impervious to legal 
formulas. The increased legalization which characterizes the Union’s approach to security and 
defence is of questionable relevance when it comes to addressing these factors. This 
observation also applies to the duty which Article 42(3) TEU imposes on Member States. This 
provision requires that Member States ‘make civilian and military capabilities available to the 
Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the 
objectives defined by the Council’. This is coupled with the duty on Member States to 
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‘undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities’.31 These  provisions appear to 
enhance the ability of the Union to carry out CSDP missions. And yet, their function is bound 
to be rhetorical at best. The choices of Member States about their capabilities are determined 
on the basis of multifarious factors extraneous to the legal provisions set out in the Treaty, 
including, but by no means confined to, internal political developments, economic exigencies, 
the geopolitical environment and the security approach of actors such as the US. The premise 
that a primary law provision would marginalize such factors and affect the political 
assessment of national authorities ignores the realities of security and defence policy.  
The record of the Union's military operations and civilian missions illustrate clearly the 
inherent limits of heavily proceduralized rules in the area introduced in the Treaties. While the 
range and territorial scope of the Union’s activities is broad, the overall size of the operations 
and missions is rather small, their mandate narrow and the terrain in which they are deployed 
largely safe. A characteristic which all military operations share is the unwillingness of the 
Member States to provide the troops necessary for deployment. Furthermore, considerable 
time and energy is spent in coordination and turf wars between the personnel deployed in 
CSDP operations and missions and other EU actors both on the ground and in Brussels.
32
  
Finally, there is another consideration which raises questions as to the role of the legal 
rules on flexibility in CFSP/CSDP. It does not follow that the ability to act faster by relying 
upon fewer Member States would necessarily render the Union’s position more credible and 
influential on the international scene. As Monar points out: 
 <quotation> [A] majority decision on a foreign policy matter is totally different in 
 character from a majority decision on an EC legal act: adopted against the will of 
 some Member States it would lose much or even most of its international credibility 
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 and could be easily subverted by signals from the opposing Member States through its 
 national diplomatic channels.
33
</quotation> 
 
<a> 6. CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this chapter suggested that differentiation and flexibility are prevalent in 
CFSP/CSDP as a wide range of arrangements which have been relied upon by the Member 
States as a matter of practice co-exist with an array of legal mechanisms set out in primary 
law. The latter lay down a heavily proceduralized framework which illustrates the conviction 
of the drafters of the Treaties that more constitutional law in this area will make for a more 
effective security and defence policy.  
This approach is entirely consistent with the general tenor of the Union’s approach to 
CSDP which is distinctly process-oriented and heavily legalized. It also gives rise to a 
paradox: while CFSP/CSDP is a policy area most suitable for accommodating differentiation 
in a wide range of mechanisms, it is also least amenable to a process-oriented management of 
differentiation. The CSDP practice has questioned further the relevance of existing primary 
rules on differentiation. All in all, there is a disjunction between the range and density of the 
rules and procedures governing flexibility and the conduct of CSDP on the ground. In this 
heavily politicized area, it appears that there is, after all, such a thing as too much law.  
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